Is all politics indeed local?  A comparative study of dual mandate-holders’ representative role attitudes and behaviours in parliament by Van de Voorde, Nicolas & de Vet, Benjamin
1 
 
 
 
State of the Federation 2017, ULB Brussels 
 
Is all politics indeed local?  
A comparative study of dual mandate-holders’ representative  
role attitudes and behaviours in parliament 
 
Nicolas Van de Voorde & Benjamin de Vet 
CLP-GASPAR, Ghent University 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
The practice of multiple office-holding i.e. the simultaneous occupation of a directly elected political 
mandate at the (sub)national and the local level, is understudied in the international-comparative 
literature. Dual officers embody the most direct link between local and central government, yet research 
has disregarded whether they actually feel and act as local ambassadors in parliament. In this paper we 
study the representative role attitudes and behaviour of dual mandate-holders in nine European 
countries, using PARTIREP Comparative MP Survey data. Drawing on the literature on parliamentary 
roles, we expect dual-mandate holders to have highly localized representative foci compared to other 
legislators, partially due to a double electoral incentive. Moreover, we also assume that dual mandate-
holders will display a local reflex in their intra-parliamentary activities by devoting more time and effort 
into defending local interests. The estimated multilevel regression models demonstrate that multiple 
office-holders indeed perceive themselves as local brokers, even when controlling for various systemic, 
party and individual level factors. On the other hand, they struggle to translate their localized attitudes 
into localized parliamentary behaviour, which could call one of the main arguments in favour of multiple 
office-holding into question.  
Keywords: dual office-holding, parliamentary roles, representative focus, members of parliament, 
legislative behaviour 
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1. Introduction 
Dual office-holding, i.e. the simultaneous occupation of a directly elected political mandate at 
the (sub)national and the local level of governmenti, is generally associated with a number of 
archetypical cases such as France or Belgium. In contrast to conventional beliefs, however, the 
practice of dual-office holding is rather widespread. Research shows that it occurs in at least 16 
European countries, with the number of local officers in (sub)national parliaments ranging from 
about five to almost eighty per cent (Navarro, 2013).  
Research on this phenomenon is, however, scarce and international-comparative work is 
practically non-existent, as most studies tend to focus on countries where dual mandate-holding 
is the rule rather than the exception. Early scholars have approached the topic from a normative 
perspective (Debré, 1955; Mény, 1992) or attempted to determine the scope of cumul des 
mandats by describing the number of local officers in parliament (Caille, 2000; Knapp, 1991). 
Only recently scholars have started to question the consequences of dual office-holding in terms 
of electoral outcomes (Foucault, 2006; Ragouet & Phélippea, 2013), parliamentary activity and 
time-allocation (Bach, 2012; François & Weill, 2016; Hájek, 2017). What remains particularly 
underdeveloped, is how and to what extent dual mandate-holding affects individual legislators’ 
attitudes and substantive behaviour in parliament. Unravelling this puzzle is essential as it 
would contribute to our understanding of broader democratic processes including parliamentary 
decision-making and political representation.  
Drawing on the literature on parliamentary roles (e.g. Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012), this paper 
analyses the representative role attitudes and the self-reported behaviour of dual mandate-
holders in nine European countries. With regard to role attitudes, we adhere to the seminal work 
of Eulau et al. (1959) and their conception of the representative focus. Whom do legislators 
(ought to) represent: the entire electorate or alternatively, a geographically or functionally 
defined segment of the population? Assuming that dual-mandate holders seek both 
(sub)national and local re-election, and are often characterized as ambassadors of their locality, 
we expect them to adopt more localized foci compared to MPs without a local office. 
Additionally, we presume that dual mandate-holders will devote more time in parliament 
advocating local interests. We estimate their local reflex by assessing legislators’ sources of 
inspiration for parliamentary initiatives and the advertisement of pork-barrel politics (i.e. 
drawing public resources to the locality).  
Our analysis, based on Partirep Comparative MP survey data (Deschouwer et al., 2014), reveals 
that local officers and mayors in parliament indeed prioritize representing the local area, even 
when controlling for a number of systemic, party- and individual-level variables in a multilevel 
regression model. On the other hand, cumulards do not seem to convert their local mentality 
into localized behaviour, which may call one of the main advantages associated with the 
practice into question. 
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In what follows, we discuss the reach and extent of dual office-holding in Europe and contend 
how a dual mandate might shape the role orientations of legislators. Afterwards, we describe 
the data and methodology and set out our results on the attitudes and intra-parliamentary 
behaviour of dual-mandate holders in Europe.  
2. Dual office-holding in Europe  
The practice of dual office-holding or cumul des mandats is far from a marginal phenomenon 
in European parliamentary democracies. In a recent attempt to provide a comparative overview 
of the frequency and scope of multiple office-holding, Navarro (2013) uncovered that double 
mandates are more mainstream than often assumed. Dual mandate-holding was found in 16 out 
of the 29 European countries under study and occurs in a number of Southern European 
countries (Spain, Portugal) as well as in some Central (e.g. Germany, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg), Northern (e.g. Finland, Sweden) and Eastern European states (e.g. Hungary, 
Slovenia).  
Of course, the extent and specific form of ‘cumul’ does vary considerably between political 
systems. First, the sheer number of local officers in parliament differs across countries. A dual 
mandate is most frequently found in France, Belgium, Luxemburg or Finland (Navarro, 2013; 
Sandberg, 2013), where more than three quarters of the legislators exercise a secondary 
position. In countries like Hungary, Sweden, Portugal or Germany, local officers also make 
their way to the legislative arena, without dominating parliament. Percentages here range from 
about 25 to 50% (Navarro, 2009; Várnagy, 2012). In other parliaments, where less than one 
fifth combines offices, for example in the Spanish senate or the Swiss cantonal parliaments 
(Boudon, 2010; Mueller, 2013), dual mandate-holding plays a more limited role.  
Second, the type and specific level of the local and (sub)national mandate vary as well, which 
is generally stipulated by legislation. The local part of the double mandate usually refers to a 
legislative (councillor) or executive function (alderman or mayor) at the municipal level. In 
certain countries, however, local government comprises several political tiers, some of which 
permit multiple office-holding. German regional and federal representatives, for instance, might 
simultaneously occupy a municipal position and reside in the Kreistag, the council of the rural 
district encompassing several communes. Similarly, other countries allow MPs to occupy a 
function at the directly elected intermediate tier, for example in France (Région or 
Départements) or Hungary (Megyék). The supralocal counterpart, on the other hand, could 
entail either a mandate at the national (or federal) or at the regional level when directly elected, 
as for example in Belgium (Gemeenschap or Gewest) or Spain (Comunidad autónoma)ii. 
Despite the rich diversity of dual mandate types, the specific configuration of local and 
(sub)national positions is inessential for our purposes because we are only interested in the 
cognitive mechanism that dual office-holding provokes. As discussed in more detail below, we 
hypothesize that multiple office-holding influences the attitudes and parliamentary behaviour 
of legislators, irrespective of the specific mandate-mix.  
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The potential consequences of multiple office-holding have only recently gained academic 
attention. Some authors have focused on the electoral implications, examining the assumed 
electoral bonus of dual mandate-holding (Foucault, 2006; Ragouet & Phélippea, 2013). Others 
have directed their efforts towards the institutional consequences such as the cumulards’ time-
allocation (François & Weill, 2016; Hájek, 2017). Logically, dual officers are obliged to devote 
some time to their local mandate and are, as such, unable to fulfil their parliamentary mandate 
to the fullest. Empirical evidence tends to confirm that dual officers are generally less active in 
parliament, although the negative correlation was primarily detected among executive deputies. 
Particularly in countries where multiple office-holding is omnipresent, the absenteeism of its 
practitioners has vital repercussions for the organisation and daily functioning of parliament.  
Another promising research topic is the prevalence of local interest representation among 
legislators with a local function. Traditionally, the combination of political mandates is 
regarded as the most direct pathway from local authorities to the central government (Sharpe, 
1970). Especially in a context where localities have few competences and limited functional 
autonomy, this direct form of access to the central decision-making level enables local deputies 
to represent parochial interest in parliament (Page & Goldsmith, 1987). To estimate the 
empirical validity of this assumption, scholars have assessed the use of formal parliamentary 
instruments for topics with a local dimension. Bach (2012, pp. 72–73), for instance, identified 
various issues as ‘local’ and tallied French cumulards’ presence in those discussions. Vaesen 
(2006) adopted a similar logic. He analysed parliamentary questions and interpellations in the 
Brussels regional assembly and regarded the use of ‘municipal affairs’ in the title as evidence 
for local interest representation.  
This ‘formal approach’, however, also has its limitations. First, the scope of what is conceived 
as ‘local’ or ‘municipal’ is often limited. In reality, local interests are not confined to a specific 
theme or activity but omnipresent and can relate to any policy theme or issue. Quantifying local 
interests in formal parliamentary instruments, therefore, is delicate and might lead us to 
underestimate the importance of local themes. Especially plenary work and the use of formal 
instruments are typically strictly regulated by political parties. Parliamentary party groups 
create the boundaries within which legislators can operate. They do not only influence what 
MPs say, through their hierarchical structures and discipline, but also affect on what subjects 
MPs can take initiatives, through an internal division of labour. Hence the mere presence or 
participation in standing committees on local affairs, to give one specific example, is a less 
appropriate indication of local interest representation. Lastly, other factors, including whether 
or not representatives belong to a governing party, could also affect the shape and content of 
parliamentary work and should therefore be taken into account. Objectively quantifying basic 
and formal parliamentary activities thus offers a valuable first insight on how dual mandate-
holders function in parliament but also suffers from some limitations. Subsequently, it should 
be complemented with alternative ways to expose local advocacy. One possibility is to adopt a 
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more ‘subjective’ approach, by examining how legislators themselves perceive and interpret 
their roles as representatives and their functions in parliament.  
3. Roles in parliament  
For decades, the main point of interest in the literature on parliamentary roles has been how 
MPs fulfil their mandates and why they do so in a specific manner. The concept of ‘roles’ is 
multidimensional and complex, which becomes apparent by looking at the abundance of 
definitions given to the concept (e.g. see Biddle, 1986). Often cited definitions are Searing’s 
(1994, p. 369), who approaches roles as “composite patterns of goals, attitudes and behaviours 
that are characteristic of people in particular positions”, or that of Strøm (1997, p. 157) who 
defines them as “behavioural strategies conditioned by the institutional framework”. Andeweg 
(2014, p. 66), on the other hand, argues in favour of disentangling the concept by making a 
clear distinction between role attitudes and behaviours. The former are ‘an individual’s 
perception of what is generally expected of her as a holder of her current institutional position’, 
which subsequently can be translated into characteristic behaviour in parliament.  
Roles are shaped by individuals’ personal goals or preferences, as well as by the institutional 
setting that expresses a number of (formal or informal) norms and expectations regarding how 
to exercise a particular position. They are ‘the application of a particular institution’s ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (March & Olsen, 1989) to the level of individual inmates of that institution 
(Andeweg, 2014, p. 66). The primary purpose of studying roles is then ‘to make sense of the 
uniformity and regularity of individual behaviour that results from a position in society and/or 
from the incorporation of collective norms’ (Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012, p. 8). From this 
perspective already, dual mandate-holding might invoke a number of incentives or expectations 
that drive legislators to adopt a particular role in parliament.  
Applied to the parliamentary arena, Blomgren and Rozenberg (2012) distinguished two 
analytical approaches on roles. Representative roles revolve around whom legislators represent. 
Roles here are often reconstructed deductively (allowing for cross-national comparisons) by 
focusing on the responsiveness of representatives, as agents, towards their multiple and 
potentially adversarial principals. Legislative roles, on the other hand, focus on how legislator 
represent and organize their activities. Scholars here do not use predefined role sets as they 
believe that ‘the best way to understand the role of politicians, is to understand them as they 
do’ (Searing, 1994, p. 10), which often results in repertoires of roles highly specific to the 
parochial features of a particular legislature (see Costa & Kerrouche, 2009). In this contribution 
we concentrate on the first approach: we are particularly interested in the representative role 
orientations of dual mandate-holders and how their attitudes interfere with their parliamentary 
behaviour. Somewhat surprising, the representative roles of dual mandate-holders have hardly 
received any scholarly attention, even though a dual office could be conceived as the ‘ultimate 
interconnection’ between national and local politics, and is hence inherently linked with 
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processes of representation. ‘Cumulards’ are agents with outspoken and potentially competing 
principals at the national (e.g. party leaders) and the local level (e.g. the municipal voters).  
The seminal work on representative roles is that of Eulau et al. (1959) who, departing from 
Edmund Burke’s historical speech to the electors of Bristol, famously distinguished between 
the 'focus’ and ‘style’ of representation (see also Eulau & Karps, 1977). The representative 
focus revolves around whom representatives believe they ought to represent: the entire 
electorate or a specific geographically (e.g. the constituency, the region, the municipality) or 
functionally (party voters, certain social groups) defined part of it. The representative style 
looks at how representatives should come to their decisions: by following their own conscience 
(as Burkean ‘trustees’) or by following the instructions of a principal, most notably voters (as 
‘delegates’). Despite some recurrent normative (Pitkin, 1967; Rehfeld, 2009) and empirical 
critiques (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2005; Converse & Pierce, 1979; Searing, 1994), the work 
of Eulau et al. (1959) continues to inspire empirical studies to this date (Blomgren & 
Rozenberg, 2012).  
When looking at dual mandate-holding, particularly the focus of representation is relevant. A 
Burkean logic would argue in favour of a universal representative focus, seeing parliament as 
“a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local 
purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general 
reason of the whole” (Burke, 1774). In daily political practice, however, MPs are inclined to 
incorporate a specific territorial dimension. Legislators often favour a more constituency-
oriented focus to secure re-election, something Burke ironically failed to do himself (Andeweg, 
2014, p. 267). It has been argued that posing as ambassador of the constituency and advertising 
attempts to defend those local grievances in the legislature increases the chances of re-election 
(Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; Carey & Shugart, 1995; Heitshusen, Young, & Wood, 2005; 
Mayhew, 1974). Or as a British MP once summarized it: “If you look after the constituency, 
they will look after you” (Searing, 1994, p. 146).  
We argue that multiple office-holding affects a legislator’s representative focus because it 
shapes both the MP’s personal goals and the expectations of their own functioning, in line with 
the basic definition of representational roles (see above). First, a dual mandate probably co-
determines legislator’s personal goals. Cumulards generally have a double electoral incentive 
as they seek both national (or regional) and local re-election. As such, one could argue that 
looking after the needs of the local area in parliament does not only pay off at the (sub)national 
elections, but also maximizes the local electoral performance, possibly further ‘localising’ their 
representative focus. Second, a double mandate could also transform the expectations towards 
that legislator’s functioning in parliament. Intergovernmental theory portrays the phenomenon 
as a compensation mechanism, especially valuable for local governments with few competences 
and little autonomy. Local deputies in parliament, then, are primarily local ambassadors, using 
their direct access to the centre to guarantee that local interests are taken into consideration in 
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the decision-making process (Hesse, 1991; Page & Goldsmith, 1987). It is plausible that these 
expectations towards cumulards shape their actual role orientation (see above), by further 
underscoring their local representative reflex. 
The theoretical link between multiple office-holding and representational role orientations, 
however, is currently met with empirical contradictions, presumably due to the misspecification 
of geographical dimension. While Brouard and colleagues (2013) could not discern whether 
French MPs with a local position focus on their district, Brack et al. (2012) conversely did find 
Belgian cumulards to emphasize their constituency more often. It is worth noting that both 
studies examine the causes of territorial foci and introduce dual mandate-holding as one of the 
many control variables argued to impact role orientations. Both case studies adopt different 
methodological designs as well, and a comparative analysis could provide more insight into the 
general effect of multiple office-holding on role attitudes. Furthermore, we believe that the 
conflicting findings might originate from a (too) broad conception of the geographical 
dimension, which is operationalized in terms of the entire constituency. We contend that dual 
mandate-holders will not be concerned more with the entire district compared to other MPs, but 
rather relate to their municipality. This is particularly relevant when the boundaries between an 
MP’s constituency and commune differ vastly. Such a narrow, municipal focus could pay off 
in both local and national elections. At municipal elections voters are likely to reward 
politicians who have shown a keen interest in promoting local grievances at the higher levels 
of government. A narrow local focus might contribute to national electoral results too, as a 
strong electoral base in the constituency starts with strong municipal foundations. As such we 
expect that:  
H1: Dual mandate-holders will be oriented more towards their municipality than other 
MPs.  
Studying representative roles as attitudinal constructs offers limited added value when they are 
not linked to observable and congruent behaviour (Müller & Saalfeld, 1997; Searing, 1994). 
Even though the work of Eulau et al. (1959) has been critized due to its limited ability to explain 
behaviour, several studies have demonstrated that the representative focus of legislators does 
matter. Gallagher and Holliday (2003), for example, confirmed that a geographical role 
orientation determines the amount and the nature of constituency work, and Andeweg (2014, 
p. 275) concurred that role patterns motivate legislators’ behaviour, albeit mainly related to 
extra-parliamentary activities such as constituency work. Although intra-parliamentary 
behaviour is often strongly influenced by party-level or systemic contextual factors, we argue 
that individual MPs with a local mandate feel strongly connected to their municipality, 
inasmuch that they will adopt their performance and activities in parliament and reassure that 
enough time and effort is put in looking after the needs of the local area.  
H2: Dual mandate-holders will show a stronger local reflex in their intra-parliamentary 
behaviour compared to other MPs. 
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4. Data and method 
Our analyses are based on data from the PARTIREP Comparative MP Survey (Deschouwer, 
Depauw, & André, 2014) which was conducted among a random sample of national and 
regional MPs in Europe. We excluded parliaments without a single dual mandate-holder. Our 
sample is, therefore, restricted to 62 parliaments in 9 countries (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland)iii. In every country at least 10% of 
the surveyed MPs declared to occupy a local office, and every parliament contained at least one 
double mandate-holder. The data were weighted by party in each parliament and by country to 
compensate for the overrepresentation of Swiss MPs. As a result, our analysis is restricted to 
1475 MPs, of which 45,5 % could be regarded as dual mandate-holder. 35,2 % of our sample 
held a ‘regular’ local mandate, entailing any directly elected political mandate except for the 
position of mayor. 10,3 % of the respondents specifically declared that they occupied the 
function of mayor. 
Table 1 illustrates that dual mandate-holding is more prevalent than often assumed, but also 
shows that the frequency of dual mandate-holding varies considerably between countries. In 
any case, the practice is far from just a French idiosyncrasy (François & Navarro, 2013). 
Nevertheless, French and Belgian MPs still rank first with high numbers of local officers and 
mayors in parliament. About half of the German and Austrian legislators exercises a secondary 
function as well, but the German Ämterkumulation is known to be a sporadic variant. Dual 
office-holders hold their local position only temporarily and withdraw from the latter a few 
months or years after their supralocal election (Navarro, 2009). In the other five countries, close 
to one quarter accumulates. Hungary stands out due to the popularity of the mayor-MP 
combination. It must be acknowledged, however, that intra-country variations also exist. For 
example, regional representatives in Austria and Germany are more likely to accumulate 
political mandates compared to their federal colleagues. As discussed above, however, the 
specific combination of local and national mandates is not relevant for our purpose, as we aim 
to assess the general effect holding several mandates. Multiple office-holding, our central 
independent variable, is consistently introduced as a categorical variable with mutually 
exclusive categories (0 = without local mandate, 1 = local office, 2 = mayor). 
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Figure 1. Percentage of dual mandate-holders in 9 West European countries (N = 1475). 
 
To account for cross-country variations and calculate intra-class correlations, several multilevel 
regression models were estimated. Our main dependent variables in the role attitude models, 
i.e. municipal and constituency focus, are constructed using a survey item asking respondents 
to indicate how important it is for them personally to represent the interest of their constituency 
or municipality on a 7-point rating scale (1= not important, 7= very important).iv The 
constituency model functions as a benchmark to compare the effects of multiple office-holding 
on the municipal focus.  
To assess the local reflex in a legislator’s behaviour, we propose to look at two different 
indicators. We purposely do not focus on roll call votes or other formal instruments as the most 
important manifestations of parliamentary behaviour. The former are less useful as indicators 
of individual role behaviour due to high levels of party unity in European parliaments, while 
the latter might indicate how productive a representative is, but possibly overlooks the local 
dimension in his/her actions. Even more, comparing formal tools across countries might prove 
problematic due to parliamentary regulations influencing the frequency and goals of such tools 
(Russo & Wiberg, 2010). We will, therefore, focus on MPs’ sources of inspiration for 
parliamentary initiatives, which is not only related to a fundamental part of legislators’ 
everyday work in parliament, but can also be expected to follow a similar dynamic for MPs 
both within and between countries. We contend that cumulards share a strong local 
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embeddedness, which will impact their inspiration for legislative activities. Research has 
already established that deputies with a strong local base are more policy-independent and, 
consequently, rely less on their party’s input for their own parliamentary work (Tavits, 2009). 
In line with this idea, we expect that dual mandate-holders will more often than other MPs rely 
on their own personal experience and on direct contacts with individual citizens as the main 
source of inspiration for their initiatives in parliament.v This approach allows an alternative 
possibility to evaluate localized behaviour and should expose more leeway for MPs to report 
individual accents in their actions, especially compared to the formal tools. Furthermore, we 
believe that the traditional parameters of constituency service, such as the amount of time spent 
in the district or holding surgeries, would grant a competitive advantage to dual office-holders. 
The latter are mechanically linked to the district through their elected local mandate, which 
requires at least some baseline attention. Moreover, it is impossible to distinguish time spent as 
a national representative in the district from time spent as a local deputy.  
Our second operationalization involves a specific action, often connected to multiple office-
holding in the literature. It is assumed that the practice is not only a direct pathway for localities 
to influence central policy-making, but also to facilitate resource gaining (François, 2013). In 
that sense, dual office-holders that effectively aim to draw national (financial) resources to their 
municipality, often termed ‘pork barrel politics’, will also be likely to advertise these attempts 
in the media. We argue, therefore, that legislators with a local position will flaunt their national 
success in obtaining local benefits more often compared to single office-holders (measured on 
a 6-point scale, from 1 = never to 6 = once a week). 
To assure the robustness of our results, a number of traditional control variables were 
introduced in all regression models. On the macro level, political system factors incentivize 
legislators to focus on a specific territorial area (Heitshusen et al., 2005, p. 33). Particularly 
electoral rules are relevant. The ballot structure is important as candidate-centred ballots, 
allowing voters to cast preference votes on individual candidates, can motivate legislators to 
cultivate a personal vote (Pilet, Freire, & Costa, 2012). Additionally, district magnitude might 
be important as small electoral districts decrease the proportionality of an electoral system and 
often direct legislators to more voter-oriented representative foci (Dudzinska et al., 2014; 
Scholl, 1986; Weßels, 1999). Lastly, we control for regional MPs as they could be expected to 
defend parochial interests more intensely because the region is geographically closer to the 
municipality. On the meso-level, a number of party-level variables might be relevant, although 
research on their impact on representative roles has not always lead to unequivocal results. We 
include ten party family dummies and control for parties’ government status (0= opposition, 1= 
government party). Moreover, intra-party candidate selection procedures might influence MPs’ 
attitudes and behaviours. Exclusive or centralized selection processes are expected to lead to 
more party-oriented roles, reinforcing party cohesion, as MPs are inclined to satisfy party 
leaders’ demands rather than pleasing voter or constituency interests (Costa & Kerrouche, 2007; 
Hazan & Rahat, 2010). Finally, we control for a number of basic individual characteristics, such 
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as sex, age, parliamentary seniority and whether or not MPs hold a prominent position in 
parliament such as Speaker, committee chairman or PPG leader. The latter could be expected 
to exploit their national status more, making them less obliged to defend communal interests.  
5. Results 
Municipal focus 
Table 1 illustrates that the municipal and constituency focus of respondents are heavily left-
skewed: a large majority of the representatives declared that both are of great importance. 
Overall, representatives are sensitive to the concerns of their home district and their home town, 
with few exceptions. Accordingly, cross-country differences remain rather limited and hard to 
discern. Due to the limited variation within the dependent variables, we subdivide respondents 
into two groups to distinguish between representatives with a (very) strong local reflex (MPs 
that scored higher than the average on the municipal or constituency focus) and deputies with 
a relatively weak local focus (MPs below the average municipal or constituency focus). A 
multilevel logistic regression is used to explain these dichotomies.  
The results from Table 1, however, already indicate that a dual mandate ‘localizes’ an MP’s 
representative foci. Additionally, bivariate correlations (not in table) signal that multiple office-
holders value territorial interests highly. Particularly mayors stand out: they attribute 
significantly more weight to promoting the collective interests of the municipality than single 
officers (p < .001) but also compared to representatives with any other local position (p = 
.001).vi Conversely, a similar analysis does not reveal significant differences between the 
constituency focus of single and dual office-holders.  
Table 1. Average municipal and constituency representational focus of MPs in 9 West European 
countries (N = 1475). 
 Municipal focus Constituency focus 
Additional 
mandate 
None Local 
office 
Mayor None Local 
office 
Mayor 
Belgium 4.80 5.46 6.02 4.48 5.10 5.50 
France 5.45 5.53 5.64 5.64 5.51 5.32 
Austria 5.92 6.32 6.79 6.04 6.34 6.00 
Germany 5.57 5.88 5.60 5.95 6.12 6.60 
Switzerland 5.26 5.60 5.98 5.21 5.26 5.68 
Hungary 6.06 5.69 6.73 5.57 5.43 6.00 
Portugal 5.55 5.74 7.00 5.72 6.28 6.00 
Spain 6.15 6.30 6.75 6.10 6.50 7.00 
Italy 5.76 6.18 6.00 5.28 5.45 7.00 
       
Total 5.58 5.79 6.15 5.56 5.74 5.73 
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The multilevel models (Table 2) clearly support the first hypothesis and demonstrate that 
multiple office-holders adopt more localized representative foci than other MPs, but also that 
they favour representing municipal interests over constituency interests. Both mayors and other 
dual-mandate holders stress their municipal focus, even when including a number of control 
variables, providing more robust support for the bivariate results. The model estimates that local 
officers are about 1.87 more likely to label representing parochial interest as very important. 
Mayors are even 4.24 times more likely to stress their strong local reflex. Both coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level. We do not find similar effects of dual-mandate holding in the second 
model estimating the constituency focus. Holding all control variables constant, we find that 
local officers are about 1.03 times more and mayors around 1.16 times more likely to have a 
strong constituency focus but neither of those coefficients are statistically significant (p = .191 
and p = .286 respectively).  
 
Table 2. Odds ratios of the logistic regression for municipal and constituency focus (weak vs 
strong) among national and regional MPs in 9 European countries. 
 Municipal Constituency 
Dual office-holding (ref = no local office)   
Any local office, expect mayor 1.871*** 1.027 
Mayor 4.244*** 1.159 
   
Political system   
Preference voting 1.640 0.782 
District magnitude (logged) 1.039 0.775*** 
Regional level MP 1.254 1.254 
   
Political party   
Member of majority 0.752 1.031 
Candidate nomination (ref = local level)   
At the regional level 1.068 0.766 
At the national level 0.625 1.049 
Selection by party leader(s) 2.466* 1.268 
Party ideology (ref = Christian democratic party)   
Social democratic party 1.192 0.574* 
Communist party 3.687 0.417 
Conservative party 1.154 0.988 
Ecologist party 0.312* 0.234** 
Far right party 0.288** 0.358* 
Liberal party 0.924 0.623 
Regionalist or ethnic party 0.549 0.319 
Other 1.893 0.364 
   
Personal characteristics   
Sex (ref = male) 1.434* 1.098 
Age 0.999 0.995 
Parliamentary experience 0.975 0.973* 
Prominent position 1.123 1.676* 
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Intercept 0.733 8.541** 
N 1340 1359 
Between-country variance 0.202 0.149 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001   
 
In sum, multiple office-holding does impact the role attitudes of regional and national 
legislators. Whereas many studies find that representative foci are predominantly determined 
by institutional features such as the electoral system or the party one belongs to (e.g. Brack, 
Costa, & Teixeira, 2012; Dudzinska, Poyet, Costa, & Weßels, 2014; Weßels, 1999), our results 
suggest that individual characteristics also matter. In addition, our analysis demonstrates that 
territorial interests should not be defined too broadly. The municipal role orientation appears to 
be a distinct variant of the territorial focus. At least when it comes to dual-mandate holding, 
local interest representation should be operationalized in terms of a municipal focus rather than 
a constituency focus as other studies often tend to do.  
 
The multilevel models additionally confirm that legislators within countries demonstrate 
similar tendencies, as the intra-class correlations are substantial in both models. The between-
country variance amounts to more than 20% in the municipal focus and almost 15% in the 
constituency focus model. This illustrates that a lot of variance is explained at the country-level, 
by (possibly intangible) elements such as the political culture or parliamentary habits. The 
country-level clusters consequently adjusted the significance levels of our control variables. In 
the municipal focus model most macro and meso-factors did not have a significant effect.vii The 
effect of an exclusive candidate selection procedure even contradicts our expectations, as 
candidates that were selected by the party leader(s) are more inclined to pursue local grievances. 
A possible explanation might be that the party elite favours successful local notables and thus 
indirectly encourages the representation of local interests. MPs from the both ecologist and far-
right parties seem to disregard the importance of place-bound issues, which could be attributed 
to their ideological opposition towards the practice of dual mandate-holding or the relatively 
weak embeddedness of their legislators. Furthermore, females seem to favour a local role 
orientation, whereas experienced MPs find it less important. The second model is similar but 
does illustrate that the district size is negatively related to constituency service.  
Municipal oriented behaviour 
As discussed above, scholars have claimed that legislative attitudes are (or should be) inherently 
linked to behaviour, both in- and outside parliament (Müller & Saalfeld, 1997; Searing, 1994). 
In line with the assumption that local officers will represent the collective interests of their 
municipality in parliament (François & Weill, 2016), we expect that multiple office-holders 
will translate their localized attitude in localized behaviour in parliament (hypothesis 2). Our 
three dependent variables that should detect this local reflex, i.e. the appraisal of pork-barrel 
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politics and the sources of inspiration for parliamentary initiatives (contacts with citizens and 
personal experience), were rescaled into dichotomies to estimate similar multilevel logistic 
models. Analogous to the municipal and constituency focus, deputies that scored above the 
mean are considered to have strong localized behaviour.  
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Table 3. Odds ratios of the logistic regression for parliamentary activities (weak vs strongly localized) among national and regional MPs in 9 
European countries. 
 Pork barrel 
advertisement 
Legislative 
inspiration: citizen 
contact 
Legislative inspiration: 
personal experience 
Dual office-holding (ref = no local office)    
Any local office, expect mayor 1.302 1.006 1.323 
Mayor 1.360 0.678 1.443 
    
Political system    
Preference voting 1.218 1.275 1.830 
District magnitude (logged) 0.783* 1.226* 0.980 
Regional level MP 1.168 0.880 0.965 
    
Political party    
Member of majority 0.989 0.634* 1.228 
Candidate nomination (ref = local level)    
At the regional level 1.752 0.537* 1.742 
At the national level 1.522 0.238*** 0.983 
Selection by party leader(s) 0.871 1.128 1.294 
Party ideology (ref = Christian democratic party)    
Social democratic party 1.105 0.549** 1.259 
Communist party 1.596 0.465 0.607 
Conservative party 2.032* 0.645 0.833 
Ecologist party 0.220** 0.156*** 0.670 
Far right party 0.403 0.505 0.179** 
Liberal party 0.665 0.564 1.126 
Regionalist or ethnic party 0.436 0.122** 0.303 
Other 10.785 0.612 0.346 
    
Personal characteristics    
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Sex (ref = male) 1.061 0.865 1.128 
Age 0.988 1.006 1.034 
Parliamentary experience 0.978 0.982 1.043 
Prominent position 1.736* 1.105 0.960* 
    
Intercept 2.119** 2.321** 0.155** 
N 1347 1168 1165 
Between-country variance 0.093 0.210 0.045 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001    
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Table 3 illustrates that neither local deputies nor mayors show indications of localized 
behaviour. Instead of acting in accordance with their representative attitudes, legislators 
struggle to translate the municipal focus into parliamentary actions. Representatives with a 
secondary local function do suggest that they advertise obtaining grants for their local area more 
often, but the effect sizes are far from significant. In the inspiration-models as well, no 
significant effects were found. Direct contact with individual citizens does not inspire 
parliamentary initiatives significantly. Similarly, dual mandate-holders do affirm that they rely 
on personal experience as a source of inspiration in their day-to-day parliamentary activities 
more often than others, but this positive relation again is not statistically significant. This does 
not mean, however, that parliamentary behaviour is unpredictable. To the contrary, our models 
are compliant to earlier results and demonstrate that existing variation is explained by 
institutional factors on the macro and meso-level. Not surprisingly, MPs from larger districts 
and those participating in government behave differently. A lot of variance is party-related, 
which is in line with the idea that political parties dominate the parliamentary arena in 
contemporary party democracies (Andeweg, 2014). 
Why then do dual office-holders struggle to practice what they preach? First, existing studies 
have suggested as well that role attitudes and behaviours are not as strongly interconnected as 
theoretically assumed. While some contribute this to a suboptimal conceptualisation of the 
(representative) role categories itself (e.g. Searing, 1994), others propose that behaviour is more 
constrained by contextual factors. If we accept that various obstacles hinder the translation of 
attitudes into behaviour, a strong representational role might not necessarily inspire legislative 
work. For example, manifest or latent expectations and rules inherent to the parliament or the 
party group can canalize individual actions (Louwerse & Otjes, 2016). Parliamentary activities 
often follow a collective logic: initiatives are only seldom drafted by a single MP. Instead they 
are mostly discussed within and controlled by the parliamentary party group (or even by the 
extra-parliamentary party). This, together with high levels of party discipline in parliament 
(Carey, 2007; Depauw, 2003), impedes the ability to stress individual preferences in parliament, 
potentially discouraging multiple office-holders to favour the interests of their commune. 
Legislators are expected to comply, regardless of their local background and their desire to act 
for their municipality. Hence, instead of assuming an infallible mechanical link between the 
both, pre-existing attitudes should be regarded as one of the motivations for behaviour, but 
certainly not as the only fundament.  
Second, the operationalization of our dependent variables, together with general issues of 
socially desirable answers in survey research, probing into the inspiration for general 
parliamentary work, might just be too broad. Research has demonstrated that legislators do 
emphasize parochial concerns in specific, yet largely symbolic, activities such as oral and 
written parliamentary questions, which are less subject to party control (Martin, 2011). Vaesen 
(2006, p. 56) concurs and even recognizes an electoral motive. The symbolic value of 
parliamentary questions, together with their large visibility, grants the dual officer a possibility 
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to demonstrate his preoccupancy with local issues and to satisfy his municipal rank and file. 
Beside these formal and institutional instruments, cumulards could opt to pursue the collective 
interest through an informal path. Representatives can attempt to persuade ministers or other 
government officials to consider certain grievances by email or even outside parliament. 
Alternatively, dual officers can appeal to their network, consult party colleagues or try to 
influence fellow legislators. Studying their extra-parliamentary behaviour could be another 
fruitful approach (see for example De Winter, 1997). Representatives have considerable more 
breathing room outside parliament and cumulards could seize this arena to circumvent the 
extensive party control on intra-parliamentary activities.  
6. Conclusion 
This study provides one of the first attempts to study the consequences of multiple office-
holding in an international-comparative context. Our analysis, based on survey data on 1475 
national and regional legislators in Europe, supports our hypothesis that multiple office-holders 
predominantly concentrate on representing the needs of their municipality, a specific variant of 
the geographical focus of representation. Whereas many studies find limited evidence for the 
impact of individual characteristics on representative role attitudes (Brack et al., 2012; 
Dudzinska et al., 2014), as these roles appear predominantly shaped by institutional features, 
our study shows a dual mandate does make a difference.  
Notwithstanding their conviction to emphasize municipal interests, however, dual office-
holders struggle to behave accordingly. Even more, in contrast to the substantial effect on 
representational role attitudes, we could not identify any significant differences in the self-
reported parliamentary activities between single and dual officers. Translating localized 
attitudes into localized behaviour thus appears difficult. Expectations, norms and rules within 
parliaments and party groups seem to restrict dual officers in displaying their local reflex. Even 
though multiple office-holders perceive themselves as local ambassadors, their actions do not 
support the traditional assumption that they actually represent their municipality in the 
parliamentary arena, which evokes the question whether local deputies are drawn to alternative 
routes to promote local issues. 
Some final reflections are imperative, as the comparative survey design eliminates several 
problems of existing research, but simultaneously exposes some additional limitations. While 
we have established a general empirical link between multiple office-holding and legislative 
attitudes, future research should sharpen the operationalization of both. A dual mandate, for 
instance, can entail various combinations that could influence parliamentary attitude and 
behaviour differently. Next to mayors, other local executives could emphasize parochial 
concerns more heavily. The municipal or regional context could shape the perception of a 
national function as well. The mayor of regional city might very well have a different 
perspective, compared to a mayor of small countryside commune. On the other hand, our 
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dependence on the self-perception of MPs to assess their behaviour might not perfectly reflect 
reality either. Whereas focusing on the objective measures of parliamentary activities could be 
regarded as an underestimation of the individual freedom of MPs, concentrating on their own 
appraisal and attitudes could lead to an overestimation. Therefore, we suggest to complement 
the dominating quantitative studies with a qualitative approach to provide a definite answer to 
the question of whether and how cumulards do actually represent local interests in parliament.  
Finally, if multiple office-holders do not suit their actions to their words, the democratic benefit 
of the practice itself could be challenged. The main advantage of dual-mandate holding is its 
potential to counterbalance hierarchical central-local relations and to ensure the inclusion of 
place-bound concerns in central decision-making. Dual-mandate holding grants local officers 
direct access to the centre and allows them to defend local issues in parliament, which might be 
deemed important particularly in systems where municipalities have limited autonomy and few 
competences. However, when dual mandate-holding has no substantial effect on parliamentary 
behaviour and when cumulards do not prove to act as local brokers in parliament – which is to 
be further explored - the question rises whether sufficient arguments remain to support the 
practice. Of course, dual-mandate holders can still be active in parliament, striving to voice 
other functional interests, but the added value of such privileged access to the centre becomes 
rather limited in that scenario. Especially when accounting for the negative implications of the 
practice – i.e. power concentration, inefficient resource allocation and absenteeism – and in the 
light of the already declining value of cumul des mandats in pluralistic and governance 
networks (Pinson, 2010, pp. 78–79), the disadvantages might even outweigh the benefits.  
  
20 
 
7. References 
Andeweg, R. B. (2014). Roles in Legislatures. In S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, & K. W. Strøm (Eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies (pp. 267–285). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Andeweg, R. B., & Thomassen, J. (2005). Modes of political representation: Toward a new 
typology. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 30(4), 507–528. 
Bach, L. (2012). Faut-il abolir le cumul des mandats ? Paris: Presses de la Rue d’Ulm. 
Biddle, B. J. (1986). Recent development in role theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 12(1), 
67–92. 
Blomgren, M., & Rozenberg, O. (2012). Legislative roles and legislative studies: the neo-
institutionalist turning point? In M. Blomgren & O. Rozenberg (Eds.), Parliamentary 
Roles in Modern Legislatures (pp. 8–36). Abingdon: Routledge. 
Boudon, J. (2010). Sur le cumul des mandats : quelle originalité française? Revue Du Droit 
Public et de La Science Politique En France et À l’Étranger, 6(1), 1691–1702. 
Brack, N., Costa, O., & Teixeira, C. P. (2012). Attitudes Towards the Focus and Style of 
Political Representation Among Belgian, French and Portuguese Parliamentarians. 
Representation, 48(4), 387–402. http://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2012.720884 
Brouard, S., Costa, O., Kerrouche, E., & Schnatterer, T. (2013). Why do French MPs Focus 
More on Constituency Work than on Parliamentary Work? The Journal of Legislative 
Sudies, 19(2), 141–159. http://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2013.787194 
Burke, E. (1774). Speech to the electors of Bristol. Retrieved November 14, 2017, from 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html 
Caille, P.-O. (2000). Le cumul des mandats au regard des expériences étrangères. Revue Du 
Droit Public, 6, 1701–1731. 
Cain, B., Ferejohn, J., & Fiorina, M. (1987). The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and 
Electoral Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Carey, J. M. (2007). Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative 
voting. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 92–107. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00239.x 
Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering 
of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies, 14(4), 417–439. http://doi.org/10.1016/0261-
3794(94)00035-2 
Converse, P. E., & Pierce, R. (1979). Representational roles and legislative behavior in France. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 4(4), 525–562. 
Costa, O., & Kerrouche, E. (2007). Qui sont les députés français? Enquête sur des élites 
inconnues. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. 
Costa, O., & Kerrouche, E. (2009). Representative roles in the French National Assembly: The 
case for a dual typology? French Politics, 7(3–4), 219–242. 
http://doi.org/10.1057/fp.2009.16 
De Winter, L. (1997). Intra‐ and Extra‐Parliamentary Role Attitudes and Behaviour of Belgian 
MPs. In W. C. Müller & T. Saalfeld (Eds.), Members of parliament in Western Europe. 
Roles and Behaviour (pp. 128–154). London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/13572339708420503 
Debré, M. (1955). Trois caractéristiques du système parlementaire français. Revue Française 
de Science Politique, 5(1), 24. 
Depauw, S. (2003). Government Party Discipline in Parliamentary Democracies: The Cases of 
Belgium, France and the United Kingdom in the 1990s. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 
9(4), 130–146. http://doi.org/10.1080/1357233042000306308 
Deschouwer, K., Depauw, S., & André, A. (2014). Representing the People in Parliaments. In 
21 
 
K. Deschouwer & S. Depauw (Eds.), Representing the People: a Survey among Statewide 
and Substate Parliaments (pp. 1–18). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dudzinska, A., Poyet, C., Costa, O., & Weßels, B. (2014). Representational Roles. In 
Representing the People: a Survey among Statewide and Substate Parliaments (pp. 19–
38). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eulau, H., & Karps, P. D. (1977). The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of 
Responsiveness. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2(3), 233. http://doi.org/10.2307/439340 
Eulau, H., Wahlke, J. C., Buchanan, W., & Ferguson, L. C. (1959). The Role of the 
Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke. American 
Political Science Review, 53(3), 742–756. 
Foucault, M. (2006). How Useful is the Cumul des Mandats for Being Re-elected? Empirical 
Evidence from the 1997 French Legislative Elections. French Politics, 4(3), 292–311. 
http://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200106 
François, A. (2013). Do French people like the “cumul des mandats”? French Politics, 11(2), 
204–215. http://doi.org/10.1057/fp.2013.5 
François, A., & Navarro, J. (2013). Le cumul des mandats en France: bilan historique et état 
des lieux de la recherche. In A. François & J. Navarro (Eds.), Le cumul des mandats en 
France: causes et conséquences (pp. 15–33). Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles. 
François, A., & Weill, L. (2016). Does holding a local mandate alter the activities of deputies? 
Evidence from the French Assemblée Nationale. French Politics, 14(1), 30–54. 
http://doi.org/10.1057/fp.2015.26 
Gallagher, M., & Holliday, I. (2003). Electoral Systems, Representational Roles and Legislator 
Behviour: Evidence from Hong Kong. New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 5(1), 107–
120. 
Hájek, L. (2017). The effect of multiple-office holding on the parliamentary activity of MPs in 
the Czech Republic. The Journal of Legislative Studies. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2017.1394735 
Hazan, R. Y., & Rahat, G. (2010). Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods 
and their Political Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heitshusen, V., Young, G., & Wood, D. M. (2005). Electoral context and MP constituency 
focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. American 
Journal of Political Science, 49(1), 32–45. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-
5853.2005.00108.x 
Hesse, J. J. (1991). Local government and Urban Affairs in International Perspective. (J. J. 
Hesse, Ed.). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Knapp, A. (1991). The cumul des mandats, local power and political parties in France. West 
European Politics, 14(1), 18–40. 
Louwerse, T., & Otjes, S. (2016). Personalised Parliamentary Behaviour Without Electoral 
Incentives: The Case of the Netherlands. West European Politics, 39(4), 778–799. 
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of 
Politics. New York: Free Press. 
Martin, S. (2011). Using Parliamentary Questions to Measure Constituency Focus: An 
Application to the Irish Case. Political Studies, 59(2), 472–488. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00885.x 
Mayhew, D. (1974). The electoral connection. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Mény, Y. (1992). La République des fiefs. Pouvoirs, 60(1), 17–24. 
Mueller, S. (2013). Shared Rule in Federal Political Systems: Conceptual Lessons from 
Subnational Switzerland. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 44(1), 82–108. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjt009 
22 
 
Müller, W. C., & Saalfeld, T. (1997). Members of Parliament in Western Europe: roles and 
behaviour. London: Frank Cass. 
Navarro, J. (2009). Multiple Office Holders in France and in Germany: An Elite Within the 
Elite? SFB 580 Mitteilungen, 33(1), 6–56. 
Navarro, J. (2013). Le cumul des mandats : une comparaison européenne. In A. François & J. 
Navarro (Eds.), Le cumul des mandats en France: causes et conséquences (pp. 117–131). 
Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. 
Page, E. C., & Goldsmith, M. (1987). Central and Local Government Relations: A Comparative 
Analysis of West European Unitary States. London: Sage. 
Pilet, J.-B., Freire, A., & Costa, O. (2012). Ballot Structure, District Magnitude and 
Constituency-orientation of MPs in Proportional Representation and Majority Electoral 
Systems. Representation, 48(4), 359–372. http://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2012.720880 
Pinson, G. (2010). France. In M. Goldsmith & E. C. Page (Eds.), Changing Government 
Relations in Europe (pp. 68–87). Abingdon: Routledge. 
Pitkin, H. F. (1967). The concept of representation. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Ragouet, P., & Phélippea, E. (2013). Cumul de mandats, accumulation de capital économique 
et performance électorale. In A. François & J. Navarro (Eds.), Le cumul des mandats en 
France: causes et conséquences (pp. 36–47). Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles. 
Rehfeld, A. (2009). Representation rethougth: on trustees, delegates, and gyroscopes in the 
study of political representation and democracy. American Political Science Review, 
103(2), 214–230. 
Russo, F., & Wiberg, M. (2010). Parliamentary questioning in 17 european parliaments: Some 
steps towards comparison. Journal of Legislative Studies, 16(2), 215–232. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/13572331003740115 
Sandberg, S. (2013). Cumul des mandats the Finnish Way. The Anatomy of Multiple-Office 
Holding among Members of the Finnish Eduskunta 2000-2012. In XXII Norkom 
conference (pp. 1–13). äbo. 
Scholl, E. (1986). The electoral system, constituency-orientation and constituentcy-oriented 
activity in European Parliament. International Studies Quarterly, 30(1), 315–332. 
Searing, D. (1994). Westminster’s World. Understanding Political Roles. London: Harvard 
University Press. 
Sharpe, L. (1970). Theories and Values of Local Government. Political Studies, 18(2), 153–
174. 
Strøm, K. (1997). Rules, reasons and routines: Legislative roles in parliamentary democracies. 
In Members of parliament in Western Europe. Roles and Behaviour (pp. 155–174). 
London: Frank Cass. 
Tavits, M. (2009). The Making of Mavericks: Local Loyalties and Party Defection. 
Comparative Political Studies, 42(6), 793–815. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008329900 
Vaesen, J. (2006). Voor gemeente en lokaal belang? De verwevenheid van het lokale en 
regionale niveau in Brussel via de cumulatie van mandaten (1989-2004). Res Publica, 
48(1), 40–65. 
Várnagy, R. (2012). Mayor or MP? The practice of dual-mandate holding in the Hungarian 
National Assembly (Ph.D. Thesis). 
Weßels, B. (1999). Whom to represent? Role orientations of legislators in Europe. In H. Schmitt 
& J. Thomassen (Eds.), Political representation and legitimacy in the European Union 
(pp. 209–234). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
23 
 
8. Notes 
i We focus exclusively on vertical cumul, which implies a combination of directly elected functions across several 
levels of government. This paper concentrates on a specific variant: the accumulation of mandates at the national 
(or regional) and local level. Conversely, horizontal cumul is disregarded here, which encompasses the 
combination of an elected position and other (semi-)public or private functions.  
ii Members of the European parliament are allowed to exercise certain local positions simultaneously, but this 
variant of multiple office-holding is disregarded here. 
iii Only three regional parliaments were excluded due to the lack of multiple office-holders: the Austrian regional 
parliament of Vienna, the Italian regional parliament of Valle d’Aoste, and the Swiss regional parliament of 
Obwalden.  
iv The question that probed for a municipal focus literally stated: “How important do you, personally, find it to 
promote collective interest like these of a particular local area, and what would that area be? Municipality”. The 
question concerning the constituency focus stated: “How important is it to you, personally, to promote the views 
and interests of the following groups of people? All the people in your constituency”. 
v The pork-barrel question stated: “Mentioned below are some of the many different things that Members of 
Parliament do to keep in touch with constituents. [publicizing your successes in attracting business and obtaining 
government grants for the local area], do you actually do it outside election campaign periods, might you do it, or 
would you never?” The initiative question stated: “Of the initiatives (e.g. bills, written and oral questions) which 
you personally raised in Parliament last year, roughly what proportion of these did you respectively derive from 
[meeting with individual citizens] and [personal experience]?  
vi Mann-Whitney U tests were used due to nonparametric data. 
vii Two identical logistic models without multilevel clustering indicated that most macro- and meso-level factors 
were significant, while maintaining the strength and significance levels for the impact of multiple office-holding. 
This implies that a lot of variance can be attributed to country differences.  
                                                     
